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One of the central claims of lean systems of work is the assertion that lean is a means to increase 
workforce skills (Womack et al., 1990; Ohno, 1988). Lean systems have been advocated on the basis that 
they promote organizational cultures of continuous improvement (Hines et al., 2004). Lean enables 
employees to use knowledge of their own jobs to improve organizational efficiency. The assertion that 
lean promotes greater skill acquisition has been subject to challenge with evidence that lean has led to 
significant reductions in skills as jobs become increasingly narrowly defined and work is intensified 
(Pardi, 2008; Stewart et al., 2009). With the expansion of lean systems into the Civil Service as a means 
of improving standards of performance (Radnor, 2010), the assertion that lean increases skills merits a 
thorough examination. Previous studies have found that rather than increase skill levels among civil 
servants, attempts at organizational restructuring have resulted in significant deskilling with evidence of 
work intensification and reductions in job autonomy (Carter et al., 2011a; Fisher, 2007; Danford et al., 
2009).  
 However, what is missing from previous studies is a detailed analysis of the decision-making 
functions of civil servants and the impact of lean upon them. The Civil Service has historically had two 
functions, first, the development of policy and, second, the implementation of policy (Campbell, 1965). 
The latter function includes not only includes administrative processes, but the judicial or quasi-judicial 
decision-making responsibilities delegated by the state to its civil servants to exercise on its behalf. This 
executive function of civil servants involves the use of discretion and judgement in the application of the 
law (Baldwin et al., 1992). Few studies have examined the exercise of quasi-judicial functions from the 
perspective of skill and the labour process. Utilising the framework of Mashaw’s (1983) model of 
administrative justice to understand civil servants’ job roles, the study will also align the changes in 
decision-making skills with the other changes in skill in the administration of Civil Service work under a 
lean regime.  
 This research, with data taken from office workplaces in two major Civil Service departments, 
contributes to a debate on the direction of skill within the public sector and the impact of efficiency cuts 
on the state sector. The capacity of civil servants to administer social security and taxation has an impact 
not only on the skills levels of a large number of public employees, but on wider society where the 
public has historically had an expectation of public probity, consistency and fairness from the state 
apparatus (Robson, 1956).  
Lean, the Civil Service and its Decision-Makers 
The arguments relating to lean and its impact on skills are well rehearsed and require only a brief 
summary. Advocates of lean systems argue that lean working has provided a significant break with 
previous systems of work organization (Womack et al., 1990). Lean not only arguably provides the 
potential for more fulfilling jobs through an environment that encourages team working and multi-
skilling, but expands the repository of skills held by each worker (Ohno, 1988). Hines et al. (2004) 
emphasise that the lean organization is one that focuses on quality and productivity promoted by 
organizational learning. Lean is advocated on the basis that it promotes job rotation, multi-skilled 
employees and gives employees the capacity to analyse and address the roots causes of efficiency 
problems through a process of continuous improvement (Womack and Jones, 1998). Unlike previous 
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work regimes, workers are empowered rather restricted by organizational systems. Employees are 
thereby able to continuously increase their skill levels in both quality and productivity to the benefit of 
their organizations. While these earlier accounts of lean largely focus on the use of lean within 
manufacturing, Womack and Jones (2005) argue lean can be successfully applied into the service sector. 
The same issues that faced that manufacturing in terms of improving organisational efficiency and 
quality are those currently faced by the state sector, and accordingly the same type of approach to 
organisational change has the capacity to improve the delivery of public services (Radnor, 2010). 
 In contrast, lean systems have been subject to critique due to the ways in which these systems 
have reduced skill. Lean’s tendency towards rigid standardisation allied to work intensification limits the 
workforce’s capacity to exercise discretion and autonomy (Pardi, 2007). The reasons for the failure of 
lean have on the one hand been attributed to management’s misapplication and misunderstanding of 
the lean ethos (Esbenshade et al., 2016). To that extent, an authoritarian approach to lean is contingent 
on the context of the firm or sector. With the appropriate levers, the reductions in skills found within a 
lean environment could be reversed. However, an evaluation of lean focusing on the context of the firm 
or workplace neglects lean’s ideological basis. Reductions in worker skill are an inevitable consequence 
of lean as employers seek to use lean techniques as a mean of increasing control over the workforce 
during a period of financial austerity (Stewart et al., 2009; Durand, 2007). To that extent, lean is used 
against workers’ interests not simply within individual workplaces, but also more widely across the 
whole economy as employers seek to reduce labour costs. 
 The state sector is not immune from the trends found in the private sector. The implementation 
of lean into the Civil Service from 2006, initially into HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), but 
subsequently into other departments in the wake of the Gershon Review (2004), was premised on the 
reduction of labour costs and attempts to increase organisational efficiency. The roll out process for lean 
in HMRC, scheduled for completion by 2013 (National Audit Office, 2011) has been matched by, for 
example, the utilisation of lean in HM Courts Service (Ministry of Justice, 2009). The rationale for the use 
of lean was ostensibly based on the changing environment of the organisation and the assertion that 
there was lack of employee skills in certain critical areas (Radnor and Bucci, 2007). Any deficiencies in 
the implementation of lean were attributable to HMRC management failing to put the needs of the 
public at the centre and thus using lean solely as a cost containment exercise rather than primarily as a 
tool to add value to the service provided (Proctor and Radnor, 2014; Seddon, 2008). However, Carter et 
al. (2011a) argue that the tightly controlled Taylorised work regime that existed within HMRC reflected 
that lean systems are fundamentally premised on control of the labour costs. The symptoms of lean 
working, including diminished task discretion and job autonomy and the devaluation of employees’ tacit 
skills (Carter et al, 2011b), are a direct consequence of the assertion of greater state control over labour 
costs. The state’s use of lean is not primarily about the improved delivery of services, but reflects the 
need to exercise control as part of neo-liberal restructuring of the state manifested in reduced resources 
to government departments delivering these services. To this extent, control is integral to lean rather 
than contingent on the capacity of management to implement it.    
The studies to date have focused largely on skill as part of a general suite of abilities that 
encompasses civil servants’ capacity to administer work processes. However, where the direction of skill 
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has been under-explored is in relation to decision-making functions. As Sainsbury (2008) highlights, the 
act of judicial or quasi-judicial decision-making cannot be entirely separate from the manipulation of the 
administrative procedures by which decisions are promulgated. However, decision-making is a distinct 
function insofar as it requires the exercise of discretion to a specific end, namely the implementation of 
the legal process on behalf of the state. 
 The Civil Service has historically divided work functions between those with the responsibility 
for the creation and development of government policy under the instruction of the government and 
those who implement state policy (Campbell, 1965). The vast majority of civil servants, working in 
around 330 departments, are engaged with the latter function. Since the 1980s, these civil servants have 
been subject to the results of extensive organizational restructuring and changes in work conditions. 
Attempts by the state to marketise the public sector have witnessed extensive privatisation of certain 
areas of civil service work, the use of private sector work practices, and decentralisation of management 
control to individual departments (Bach and Kessler, 2012; Pyper and Burnham, 2011). The impact has 
been to change how government departments manage their staff in terms of their human resource 
policies and how management allocate and control work tasks at a workplace level. The demise of whole 
case working where employees managed the end-to-end process (Fisher, 2004) and the extensive use of 
metrics to measure public sector performance has led to increased pressure on civil servants to focus 
solely on those parts of their jobs that are linked to government targets and to the routinisation of much 
Civil Service work.  
 Moreover, there is also an historic division among civil servants engaged in the implementation 
of state policy between those who have a clerical function and those with an executive function 
(Campbell, 1965). The latter group was historically assumed to have the capacity to act with discretion 
and judgement. It is this group of civil servants who have traditionally been decision-makers. In social 
security adjudication, for example, Baldwin et al. (1992) explained that in terms of decision-making civil 
servants exercise a quasi-judicial function. This is the legal process whereby civil servants through the 
application of discretion and judgement apply the law to claims for social security benefits. It is quasi-
judicial insofar as it lacks some of the investigatory powers of appellate tiers of adjudication. Discretion 
is embedded into the quasi-judicial function insofar as it is exercised within a set of rules and standards 
(Harlow and Rawlings, 2006). It assumes the capacity of decision-makers to select the correct course of 
action exercising expertise and judgement in the application of statute and case law (Freedman and 
Vella, 2012). However, changes in the legal basis upon which decisions have been made have not 
necessarily changed how discretion is exercised (Adler, 2006; Sainsbury, 2004, Gulland, 2011). Changes 
in practice are in part affected by the move to computerisation where the decisions are promulgated 
through data input (Adler, 2006), but also because of broader political and economic pressures on 
systems of governance. 
 Mashaw (1983) argued in his analysis of US social security administration that there were three 
approaches to administrative justice and the associated decision-making. The first of these, bureaucratic 
rationality, is premised on delivering “accurate and efficient concrete realizations of the legislative will” 
(1983:24-25). Decision-makers in this model adjudicate on claims in the most accurate and cost-
effective fashion trading off the risk of potential errors against administrative and process costs. 
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Individual adjudicators engage in gathering, processing and evaluating information within the confines 
of standardised rules and routines albeit for management the process is treated as technocratic. 
Mashaw contrasts this model with the professional treatment model where decisions are based on 
interpersonal relationships with clients and diagnostic intuition. His third model is described as ‘moral 
judgment’ where impartial decision-makers arbitrate between competing claims based on underlying 
moral principles. The interrelationship of the three models existing within one structure is subject to 
tensions as professional judgment can be undermined by “programmatic rationality” where vocational 
experts are cast in a subversive light. 
Baldwin et al. (1992) argue that the form of decision-making found within social security 
adjudication in the UK was most closely related to the bureaucratic rationality model. Decision-making 
relied on the collection of information and the application of statute or case law, but was also 
constrained by management’s need to achieve performance targets and save processing costs.  
Although most decisions were routine and repetitious, the pressure on adjudication officers to achieve 
targets had a negative impact on quality of decision-making. Although the majority of Civil Service work 
matches most obviously with this bureaucratic rationality model, government services also include 
those whose work is more aligned with the professional treatment model. Advisers in Job Centres have 
a range of options with which to address clients’ employability issues and as such use their professional 
knowledge to fit individual circumstances. However, as Sainsbury (2008) argues, the pressure to make 
financial savings in these areas has also reduced the amount of discretion that can be exercised. 
Achieving performance targets around employment statistics in effect compromises the quality of the 
service provided and effectively reduces the discretion of the decision-maker. The model of 
administrative justice has arguably moved to one that reflects a managerial model where there is 
increased reliance on standardised and automated decision-making where the capacity to exercise 
discretion is systematically and deliberately squeezed out (Adler, 2006).  Taking its cue from New Public 
Management, the main features of this model are managerial autonomy, performance standards and 
audit. 
 This research evaluates how the increased use of lean systems of work has altered the ways in 
which social security and taxation decision-makers exercise their skills and to what extent skill levels 
have increased or decreased. The distinction between the discretionary act of decision-making and the 
accompanying administrative process are critical in this respect. The research will also argue that the 
changes brought about by lean are indicative of changes in the model of Civil Service work.  
Methodology 
The data for this research was collected from the Public and Commercial Services Trade Union (PCS). PCS 
had longstanding concerns over deskilling and intensification of work, initially in the wake of the 
implementation of lean in HMRC and latterly more widely throughout the Civil Service (Gall, 2007). PCS 
had commissioned the researcher to examine the impact of lean. PCS provided support through its 
branch structure for the researcher to access participants allied to personal contacts that the researcher 
had through his previous membership of PCS. 
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The initial phase of the research (2008 to 2010), consisting of 15 interviews with senior paid 
officials and PCS stewards, was devoted to gaining an overview of lean within the Civil Service before the 
narrowing the focus to HMRC and the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). These two large 
government departments were selected due to ease of access, but also because of their widespread use 
of lean, often in piecemeal fashion. Large business units such as tax processing were often at the 
forefront of lean implementation although management also introduced lean in smaller self-contained 
specialised areas of work. A total of 39 PCS stewards and members from DWP and HMRC were 
interviewed either individually (face to face or by telephone) or in groups over the period May 2010 to 
June 2011. These interviews were supplemented by attendance at union meetings. With the consent of 
the participants, most of the interviews were recorded and transcribed with supporting written notes 
taken.  
 The 39 interviewees were representative of a range of work duties. Historically only executive 
grades (EO) would have had authority to make quasi-legal decisions (Campbell, 1965), but increasingly 
‘simple’ decision-making has been devolved to administrative grades or clerical officers (CO) leaving 
‘complex’ decisions, ostensibly based on the exercise of discretion, to executive officers. Table 1 
provides detail on job role, grade, gender, length of interview and union role of the interviewees. 
The research used a range of proxies to evaluate the direction of skill recognising the 
multifaceted nature of skill. The interviews were structured to systematically address each of the 
proxies. The proxies used were substantive job complexity and work autonomy (Spenner, 1983). These 
have been used extensively within the Skills Survey (British Market Research Bureau, 2006). Job 
complexity in this study was based around length of training, the amount of time required to 
consolidate training to achieve proficiency in the role job and task variety each of which should be 
considered in relation to external circumstances (Field, 1980; Spenner, 1983, Felstead et al., 2004). 
Reductions in discretion and freedom to act, pace of the job and level of supervision serve as measures 
relating to the level of job autonomy (Spenner, 1990). With the capacity to exercise discretion central to 
any form of legal decision-making, these well-established proxies remain valid in evaluating skill changes 
in the Civil Service.  
Decision-making skills and job complexity 
What was first evident in both HMRC and DWP was the reduction in time given to training and 
consolidation for all aspects of administrative work. However, in terms of decision-making, these trends 
were also in evidence. Whereas training for certain types of social security had previously been based on 
an extended period of classroom-based training, there was an on-going trend to change the format and 
length of training. Where previously training on some of the main social security benefits was based on 
13 weeks’ classroom attendance, training on Employee Support Allowance was reduced to five weeks 
training and three weeks consolidation ‘on the job’. A further six weeks were then allowed to achieve 
line manager assurance of competence whereby decision-makers had to assess 50 claims without error.  
In Social Fund, decision-makers were provided with two weeks of training although staff members were 
in effect handling telephone applications for crisis loans within two days of the start of the consolidation 
period. More extreme examples of attempts to curtail training include: 
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one of the trainers boasted that they’d managed to get [training] down from three full nights 
which would have been 15 hours; they’d managed to get it down to 10 hours (steward in HMRC, 
Interview 9) 
However, the more telling factor was a change in the rationale of training and its consolidation under 
the lean regime. 
 Consolidation was increasingly geared to handling a very limited range of duties within a very 
narrow context. The rationale for consolidation activity was increasingly geared towards the 
development of skills in decision-making in terms of a single aspect of tax or social security. It was not 
simply that training and consolidation was based on a single job role. There was no longer a 
presumption by management that successful consolidation of one job role was reliant on understanding 
where the individual trainee’s work fitted with related and dependant job roles. While longer serving 
civil servants with background knowledge of the work of their departments were better able to adapt to 
new job roles, newer staff members were significantly more affected by this new rationale. Even within 
those parts of the Civil Service where the potential for the professional treatment model existed, 
management constrained the extent to which consolidation of new skills could be applied. One adviser 
in a Job Centre stated: 
this is one of the complaints because a number of our staff when we opened our Jobcentre in 
2006 were very good, very knowledgeable about the benefits and one of the great frustrations 
was that you were told not to use that knowledge, simply to signpost people to phones 
(Interview 2) 
There was little expectation that jobholders required appreciation where their decision-making 
functions fitted with the wider purposes and organization of their departments. Added to this, 
specialised training in the complex aspects of decision-making was rare among respondents and absent 
from the training for simple decision-making.  
 Fitting consolidation in decision-making skills to meet the confines of individual job functions in 
isolation to other job roles was to a large degree a consequence of reductions in task variety. Work 
within HMRC and DWP was increasingly fragmented within and between workplaces. Management 
allotted tranches of work to separate locations obviating the need to have decision-makers expert in a 
range of benefits or tax in each location. Even within individual offices, work was streamed into its 
component specialist areas. The lean regime further exacerbated this trend with its emphasis on 
standardisation. Accordingly, there was very limited scope for local offices to adopt distinctive working 
practices to suit local circumstances: offices doing similar types of decision-making become more 
homogenous in their work organization.  There was less scope for management to provide staff 
members with a range of duties with less capacity for interchangeability across different decision-
making disciplines. There was restricted scope for task variety within individual job roles. One Social 
Fund Officer in ironic tone said: 
I do Community Care Grants and I do Community Care Grants and then if I’m lucky I’ll do a 
Community Care Grant (Interview 1) 
 7 
 
These reductions in variety were both antecedent to the introduction of lean systems in HRMC and 
DWP, but also central to the implementation of lean. With work previously subject to fragmentation, 
reductions in task variety were evident before lean was rolled out, but the implementation of lean made 
it easier to reduce task variety still further. The fragmentation of work in effect begets further 
fragmentation.  The areas where lean was less embedded retained more of the earlier model of work 
where civil servants had the capacity to switch between different types of decision-making albeit within 
the same broad area. With management intent under the lean regime to centralise blocks of work, 
decision-makers were effectively restricted to dealing with a limited range of activities.  
Of those interviewed, around two third of interviewees confirmed that job complexity had 
reduced over the previous five years. Remaining interviewees had seen no change or had experienced 
an increase in job complexity. Factors in maintaining or increasing job complexity included promotion 
and transfer between departments. However, the other mitigating factor that contributed to retaining 
elements of job complexity reflected the modifications and judgements that decision-makers needed to 
make in applying the law to individual taxpayers or social security claimants.  
Respondents referred to the complexity engendered by the need to deal with the public whose 
circumstances were significantly more complex than HMRC and DWP management seemed prepare to 
consider. One administrative officer in DWP referred to the problems he encountered when dealing 
with callers at the Job Centre: 
You’re interfacing with the public and within that group of the public a significant minority of 
people who, as you say, have chaotic lifestyles who actually may present at the Jobcentre in a 
disinhibited fashion (Interview 21) 
Attempting to make appropriate decisions for those whose circumstances are complex makes the job 
function more complex than that conceived by management. Allied to this, the legislation under which 
decision-makers are expected to operate and facts of any individual tax or social security benefit both 
contain elements of complexity. Even with lean systems premised on filtering work into streams that 
sought to remove the need to deal with complex issues, these systems did not sift out complex issues. 
One tax officer in HMRC stated that his job assumed he would only ever deal with ‘clean debt’, but in 
reality, both the individual facts of the case and the law created complexity hindered by his lack of legal 
training.  
Nonetheless, while these mitigating factors sustained some job complexity, what was apparent 
was the pressure that lean working had in the opposite direction to simplify jobs. The more vigorously 
management applied lean and the more embedded lean became, the greater the reductions in job 
complexity became.  
 While the situation around job complexity was not wholly bleak, the picture in terms of work 
autonomy and decision-making was much more negative for reasons that will become apparent. 
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Decision-making skills and autonomy  
Decision-making is never unfettered within the Civil Service. Fundamental to the adjudication process is 
the premise that decisions are made within the limits imposed by legal requirements. In addition to 
statute law, decision-makers follow supporting guidance issued by their departments to assist with the 
decision-making process. However, the decision-making process presumes the conscious application of 
rules and guidance to any given social security or tax claims. Discretion is thereby embedded into the 
decision-making process even if decisions have only binary outcomes. However, as Baldwin et al. (1992) 
highlight, adjudicating officers historically did little “adjudication”: most decisions were done de facto by 
administrative officers. Discretion was often implicitly exercised rather than consciously expressed as a 
formal act. While there was variety in practice with some types of decision-makers more conscious of 
the legal basis of their decisions (in the interviews, Social Fund Officers often referred to specific parts of 
the legislation), the research found limited evidence of the exercise of the explicit use of discretion.  
 In HMRC and DWP, levels of discretion varied according to the specific area of work. Some of 
the areas of work were not complex and decisions were mundane requiring little discretion. The shift to 
downgrade simple decision-making to administrative officers whose training largely related to the 
administrative processes of the decisions rather than understanding their legal basis meant for the most 
part that decision-making was treated as an automated process. Elements of the different 
administrative jobs retained the exercise of some specialised knowledge. However, use of discretion 
where decision-makers had the capacity to purposively select from two or more courses of action each 
potentially valid on its own merits was rarer. For the most part, decisions were promulgated through 
inputting data to a computer system rather than an explicit act of decision-making.  Advisers in the Job 
Centres did have a menu of activities to which they could refer job seekers and Social Fund Officers 
relied on the exercise of judgment in allocating funds from a discretionary fund. Nonetheless, the 
understanding of management of the parameters under which staff members operated was limited 
even within these areas of work. One Social Fund Officer stated: 
you could look at guidance, you could get two people looking at it and come up with the 
different decisions. You can still do that just now, but I think [management] would be surprised 
if you came up with different decisions for the same type of case (Interview 3) 
While there was no evidence found to indicate that managers were directly subverting the decision-
making process, pressures were placed on staff members to take a stricter approach in such areas as job 
seeking. It was into this changing environment of decision-making that lean was implemented. 
 While lean systems were never ostensibly used to influence the content of decisions, lean was a 
significant contributory factor in increasing the pace of decision-making.  Cuts in Civil Service staffing of 
around 21% over the period 2006 to 2014 (Office for National Statistics, 2016) are clearly relevant with 
less people available to undertake work functions, but for individual PCS members at a workplace level, 
the increasing pace was manifested in a number of ways. There was extensive use of standardised forms 
and electronic systems to facilitate the decision-making process. These forms were implemented by 
management on the basis that these would speed up the decision-making process. The electronic ‘hand-
offs’ between one part of the computer system and another accelerated the pace of work. The speed of 
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decision-making was also significantly affected by management’s use of often arbitrary performance 
targets rather than the need to ensure that the public had quality decisions. Baldwin et al. (1992) had 
identified this paradox as a longstanding issue within the Civil Service, but in the changing environment 
of computerisation and the adoption of lean working, the pace of work was accelerated.  
Increased speed of decision-making did not necessarily equate to increased quality. One Social 
Fund Officer commented on lean decision-making templates that he and his colleagues were expected 
to use. The templates had been trialled at another location and rolled out to his site. These templates 
were not ultimately used, but presaged the introduction of electronic lean forms. He said:  
we saw some of these [name of location] decisions and they were possibly some of the worst 
things you could possibly see and I think it died a death. I mean electronic [forms] for 
[Community Care Grants] did come in, but when it came in last year decision-makers ended up 
taking twice as long [laughs] to do decisions using this one, […] and that was supposed to be a 
lean document (Interview 3) 
Furthermore, performance targets were sometimes based on factors unrelated to the quality of the 
decision. In the Social Fund call centres, performance targets were based on the number of calls 
answered daily, not primarily on the quality of the decision. The temptation was for call handlers to 
manipulate the statistics by treating a proportion of calls as “inappropriate” and curtailing those calls: 
claimants were advised at the outset of the call that their applications would be unsuccessful or be 
refused the opportunity to apply on spurious grounds (for example failing to quote a home postcode 
correctly).  By denying someone a decision, it also denied that person the accompanying appeal rights 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2013). The pressures placed on staff members, backed up by 
threats of poor performance appraisal reviews for those who failed to achieve targets, effectively 
impacted on the quality of the legal process. The reductions in staff numbers meant that lean systems 
ostensibly implemented by management as a means of improving the quality of service were used 
instrumentally only to the extent that they achieved performance targets. Lean techniques such as focus 
groups and performance improvement boards were manipulated by managers at local office level to 
reduce the time available to undertake decision-making activity. This ‘guerrilla lean’, as one senior trade 
officer named it, in one example was manifested where the local lean champion reduced the time 
allocated for individual job seeker interviews. Despite the fact that longer interviews were valued by 
staff members in assisting people with their job search activities, the reductions in the number of staff 
available, allied to the performance targets potentially missed by extended interviews, outweighed the 
value of the quality of decisions reached. 
 Social Fund decision-makers were at the ‘sharp end’ of the increases in pace and electronic 
supervision systems used in the DWP telephony systems. However, across DWP and HMRC it was 
evident the reductions in skill in decision-making were significantly more in evidence in terms of losses 
of autonomy than they were in terms of job complexity. In those areas where lean was embedded, such 
as the tax processing centres in HMRC, decision-makers were significantly more subject to deskilling 
than in those areas of the Civil Service where lean was more ‘light touch’. These embedded lean areas 
included routine and repetitious decision-making and areas where there was scope for decision-makers 
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to select between different courses of action. Although on one level, legal requirements safeguarded 
the quality of the decisions reached, an amalgamation of reduced levels of discretion and increasing 
pace of work in effect reduced the levels of autonomy and control that decision-makers had over their 
quasi-legal responsibilities. It was noticeable there was no evidence to suggest that management used 
lean to interfere with the content of decisions. Lean systems in the Civil Service were used primarily to 
affect the process of reaching decisions rather than their content, but it is impossible to separate the 
promulgation of decisions from the process by which those decisions were reached. 
Discussion and conclusion 
In DWP and HMRC, the tools and techniques of lean were central to reducing job complexity and 
autonomy. These factors, proxies for the reduction in skills, are congruent with recent trends across the 
UK post 2006 where there has been an increase in work intensification (Gallie et al., 2013). The current 
study builds on the study of Carter et al. (2011a) to show that significant instances of deskilling were not 
confined to one area of Civil Service work. What is striking about this current study of decision-making is 
that even in areas ostensibly protected by legal or quasi-legal requirements skill levels were reduced.  
Changes in the training regime, work standardisation and reduced staff numbers were significant 
factors. Allied to this, senior management increasingly used the EO grade, not as technical decision-
making experts, but as people whose role was primarily to performance manage subordinate staff 
(Carter et al., 2013). All of these factors diminished the capacity of the decision-makers to reach 
appropriate and independent decisions. Politically, the purity of decision-making was notionally 
sacrosanct and interviewees were generally very protective of their belief in the quality of their decision-
making. However, in practice management’s use of lean had a significant impact on the process of 
decision-making. 
 The distinction between process and content is significant, but in practice, it is also blurred. The 
lack of previous work on decision-making may in part reflect that the distinction between content and 
process is artificial in the practice. This is more evident in some areas than in others. In areas of simple 
decision-making, the promulgation of a decision is largely indistinguishable from the data input that 
produces the decision for the public. For more complex areas of decision-making, the legal or quasi-legal 
process has a distinct entity. Decision-makers were here more obviously aware of the distinction 
between process and content. Social Fund Officers and specialist tax officers either referred to the 
specific parts of legislation by its correct terminology or had a clear appreciation of the specific legal 
principle on which their decisions were reached. In the areas where professional judgment was 
exercised, for example advisers in a Job Centre, there was also a distinction between process and 
content as the individual circumstances of the public were identified and assessed. Nonetheless, 
irrespective of the degree to which civil servants distinguished between content and process, HMRC and 
DWP management accelerated the blurring of these lines using lean working.  
 Increasingly, Civil Service management premised their treatment of tax and social security 
decision-making on the efficiency of the administrative processes. Lean was central to addressing more 
efficient and quicker ways of dealing with these areas of work. There is a danger of examining the past 
through rose-tinted spectacles imagining a ‘golden age’ of adjudication where decision-makers engaged 
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in pure adjudication freed from the burden of administrative processes. However, management 
pressures on staff members to attain targets and the historic blurring of the distinction between 
administrative procedures and decision-making was, as Baldwin et al. (1992) testify, always present. 
However, lean with its emphasis on standardisation and the substitution of individual discretion with 
greater control over the labour process has done two things.  
First, it has placed greater emphasis on performance targets, often unrelated to the quality of 
the substantive quasi-legal decisions that these are supposed to represent. There was a clear reduction 
in the amount of discretion that decision-makers could exercise as the time allocated to the collation of 
information required to reach an appropriate decision and the time to consider the full implication of 
outcomes was reduced. This was allied to the presumption of management that all decisions were 
capable of only one interpretation. In some cases, the simplification of the legislation and the increasing 
promulgation of decision by computer were significant in this respect. However, the pressure to reduce 
all decisions to binary options rather than take into account the complexity of individual circumstances 
and different interpretations of the facts and law was increasingly a feature of the quasi-legal decision-
making process. Due to management pressure, it was increasingly evident that civil servants often had 
to compromise the amount of time they could allocate to each decision. There was a sense of 
resignation to the tone of many of the interviews where decision-makers, knowing the consequence of 
failing to meet a performance target, had to compromise the legal quality of their decisions. With union 
stewards stretched often dealing with individual case representation and the pressure of their Civil 
Service work, there was very limited scope for PCS members, either individually or collectively, to 
challenge this new regime.  
Second, lean had the impact of purposively conflating the quasi-legal decision-making processes 
with the administrative processes thereby in practice eliminating the distinction between the two. In 
effect, lean was used to treat all aspects of Civil Service work as administrative processes. It comes as no 
surprise that the types of deskilling explored by Carter et al. (2011a) in the HMRC tax processing centres 
were as prevalent in this study among decision-makers as they were among those staff members 
involved in administrative work. Deskilling became more prevalent as lean sought to remove the 
vestiges of discretion in decision-making. In terms of the training provided to new decision-makers, the 
amount of consolidation and the narrow focus of the jobs undertaken, management used lean working 
to deskill decision-making where the efficiency of the administrative process, itself subject to significant 
deskilling, was paramount. With ever-decreasing numbers of staff and increasing performance targets, 
the pressures to further deskilling accelerated. 
 Baldwin et al. (1992) describe the model of administration found within the DWP of the early 
1990s as bureaucratic rationality. Lean systems have arguably not only embedded this model even 
further into the management system of the Civil Service, but this has been at the expense of attempting 
to eliminate elements of the professional treatment model. The tensions within the co-existing models 
of social security administration that Mashaw (1983) described continue to be relevant in the current 
environment. Lean systems emphasise the process of applying tax and social security decisions at the 
expense of professional judgement or expertise in decision-making. What is evident from this research is 
that the tensions previously evident in the UK Civil Service where performance targets were central to 
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decision-making have become even more apparent. With training and consolidation of skills based 
around a narrow range of duties and a regime of standardised work made to fit a lean agenda, 
management have devalued both professional judgment and the use of discretion in the decision-
making process.  The attainment of performance targets becomes the central measure of valid decision-
making rather the quality of the decisions themselves.  It is in the blurring of the distinction between 
process that supports decision-making and the outcome or content of any decision where the shift 
towards a different model of the Civil Service is seen. Process is the aspect that is most easily susceptible 
to measurement while content may require judgment to validate its worth. Hence, rather than measure 
the discretionary element of the work, Civil Service management use process measures to validate the 
quality of the decisions. With declining staff numbers and a lean regime squeezing more out of less, 
management can manipulate the targets to gain greater control of the labour process.  
 The model of work found in HMRC and DWP is arguably not simply one based on bureaucratic 
rationality, but in line with Adler (2006), is a managerial one. Adler completed his work in the period 
before lean was used. The trend towards the use of performance targets and the paramountcy of 
managerial autonomy is now even more clearly evident. The emphasis on compliance with standardised 
rules is also important, but where this is particularly relevant in terms of the lean regime is the way that 
compliance to the rules of the decision-making is cast by management leaving increasingly less scope for 
civil servants to interpret the rules independently of their management. With the narrowing of the skill 
base in training and consolidation allied to limitations of the application of discretion, decision-making 
skills are set in a spiral of decline. The lean regime that premises the managerial model of work over 
other models of administration is thus central to the decline of decision-making skills. 
 Nonetheless, the evidence shows a continuing residue of skills in both HRMC and DWP within its 
decision-making function. Despite the reductions in discretion and autonomy, decision-makers proved 
capable of addressing both factually and legally problematic matters often in the face of management’s 
limited cognizance of inherent complexities within the tax and social security systems. The public arena 
of social security and tax is subject to debate particularly under the neo-liberal regime. However, at very 
least there is an expectation by the public that civil servants implementing state policy have the skills to 
apply the law to allow tax payers and social security claimants appropriate appeal rights. The decline in 
skills has the potential not only to reduce the quality of the decisions made, but, as the research has 
shown, in some instances denied legal rights of appeal or redress.  
The future of skills within HMRC and DWP remains unclear. It is beyond the scope of the article 
to examine the ways that legislation itself is being simplified and how that will impact on skills. Since the 
conclusion of this research, aspects of the Social Fund were abolished eliminating social security benefits 
that were based on the exercise of decision-making discretion. To some extent, the impact of new tax 
rules and social security benefits must remain speculative.  The extent to which the PCS has been 
successful in fighting to uphold the skills of its members is a significant issue, but also remains beyond 
the scope of this article. What this research does highlight is that the leaning of decision-making is but 
one further element of the restructuring of the state sector. The changes in decision-making are 
symptomatic of a move from a primarily bureaucratic rationality model to a managerial one. The 
research confirms that even with the limited protection afforded to decision-makers to apply their 
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discretion independently of management pressure that no part of the labour process is left untouched 
by lean. Increased use of lean is not a source of optimism for the future: the implementation of lean in 
HMRC and DWP has led to significant deskilling among decision-makers. In the current environment 
where a managerial model of administration currently predominates, the challenge for the general 
public, civil servants and trade union alike is how to reverse this trend. 
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Table 1 
Interview DWP/HMRC Job Role: 
Decision-
maker () 
Grade Gender Length of 
interview 
(minutes) 
Union role 
1 DWP  EO Male 82 Member 
2 DWP  EO Male 43 Steward 
3 DWP  Higher EO Male 71 Steward 
4 DWP  EO Male 84 Member 
5 DWP  CO Male 58 Steward 
6 HMRC  EO Female 66 Member 
7 DWP  EO Male 93 Steward 
8 DWP  EO Male 44 Steward 
9 (Group of 
3) 
HMRC  CO 2 Male, 1 
Female 
64 Stewards 
10 HMRC  CO Male 66 Steward 
11 DWP  CO Male 66 Steward 
12 DWP  CO Male 45 Steward 
13 (Group of 
4) 
DWP  EO and CO Male 60 Stewards 
14 HMRC  EO Male 66 Steward 
15 DWP  EO Male 10 Steward 
16 HMRC  CO Male 48 Steward 
17 DWP  CO Female 49 Steward 
18 DWP  CO Male 68 Steward 
19 DWP  EO Female 66 Steward 
20 DWP  CO Male 43 Steward 
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21 DWP  CO Male 76 Member 
22 DWP  EO Male 46 Member 
23 DWP  EO Male 61 Steward 
24 DWP  EO Female 38 Member 
25 DWP  EO Female 38 Member 
26 DWP  EO Female 21 Steward 
27 DWP  CO Female 21 Steward 
 
* In addition, there was a group interview of DWP branch committee members consisting of both male 
and female EOs and COs, DMs and non-DMs, lasting 30 minutes. 
 
